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Limiting the State's Police Power: Judicial
Reaction to John Stuart Mill
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral, is not a sufficient warrant.'
John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty2 considers in great detail the nature
of that individual conduct which the state is justified in controlling and
beyond which the state should not interfere. The basic element of
Mill's libertarian philosophy with respect to this aspect of individual
liberty is that an individual's own welfare, physical or moral, is not
sufficient ground in itself to justify the state's interference with the
individual's conduct. The attitude of American courts toward the use
of this criterion as a basis for proscribing state regulation of individual
conduct is the primary concern of this comment. 8
1 J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in MiLL, UTU.irAUNISM, LMERTY, Arm REsPREENTATmVE GoVzRN-
sm- 95-96 (Am. ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as Mmi.]. The full paragraph from which the
headnote is taken reads:
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to
govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of
compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form
of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is,
that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively,
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any mem-
ber of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to
do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do
so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with
him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for
compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To
justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated
to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for
which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself,
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
The sections of Mill's essay most relevant to the discussion in this comment are Chapter
IV, Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual, and Chapter V,
Applications. MILL at 176, 201.
2 Id.
8 Mill was born in 1806 and published his essay On Liberty in 1859. Obviously Mill
himself did not influence the writers of the Constitution. However, Mill did elaborate
on many of the concepts of political freedom which had evolved in the century before
him. It is in the sense that Mill was one of the most eloquent spokesmen of these
concepts that this comment speaks of Mill's philosophy or, more specifically, Mill's
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One underlying difficulty in pursuing the inquiry that will be at-
tempted here should be noted at the outset. Despite the extraordinary
position of On Liberty as a document which is regarded by many
people of differing political persuasions as a statement of fundamental
political truth-witness the claim to Mill's support by both Lord Devlin
and H. L. A. Hart in their dialogue on the enforcement of morality4
-Mill's principle, especially in its explicit form, generally does not
enjoy high visibility in judicial decisions. One explanation for the low
visibility of Mill's influence in the case law is that such influence prob-
ably had an impact on the legislative process, thus effectively screening
out those measures most obnoxious to Mill's principle and to the legis-
lators' concern with individual freedom. A second explanation lies in
the decline of substantive due process and the consequent narrowing
of judicial willingness to limit the state's exercise of the police power.5
A court's failure to limit legislation clearly inconsistent with Mill's
formula may therefore be attributable to its reluctance to act at all
rather than to its rejection of Mill sub silentio. Thirdly, since there is
no specific constitutional provision embodying Mill's principle-not-
withstanding two recent Supreme Court decisions which might be read
broadly to suggest a constitutionally derived criterion akin to Mill's 6-
courts may be reticent to strike down such legislation in the absence
of a more explicit constitutional mandate. In short, implicit or explicit
recognition of Mill's principle in judicial decisions may not accurately
reflect its continuing vitality as a limitation on governmental action.
It should also be noted that the apparent simplicity of Mill's proposi-
tion may disappear when it is applied in particular circumstances. The
distinction between conduct affecting others and conduct affecting only
one's self is essentially one of degree.7 Mill himself, for instance, puz-
zled over the application of his criterion to the keeping of a gambling-
criterion for testing the legitimacy of state interference with individual conduct. It is
also important to recognize that it is Mill's political theories, and not his economic
theories, that are under consideration.
For discussion of the political thought contemporaneous with the writing of the
Constitution, see generally A.H. KELLY, WHERE CoNSTITUTIoNAL LIBERTY CAME FROM
(1954); C. MULLET, FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1770-1776 (1966);
C. RossrrER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1963); Pound, The
Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty, 20 NOTRE DAME L.Aw. 183, 347
(1945).
4 SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 9-13 (1965); H.L.A. HART, THE
MORALrrY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1965); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY
(1963).
5 See text at notes 100-3 infra.
6 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), discussed in text at notes 54-60 infra; Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479 (1965), discussed in text at notes 96-98 infra.
7 See text at notes 70-77 infra.
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house in light of his conclusion that gambling, considered alone, affects
only the individual.8 Despite the difficulties which are inherent in most
attempts to draw distinctions suggested by Mill's principle, it neverthe-
less raises important questions about many areas of legislation. Compul-
sory medical,9 and mental 0 treatment, the prohibition of the consump-
tion of allegedly harmful substances," participation in air raid drills, 12
regulation of sexual mores,13 industrial safety measures, 14 and compul-
sory insurance'; are but a few examples. This discussion will focus on
three representative areas: intoxicating liquor, motorcycle helmets, and
the possession of obscene material. Liquor regulation provides an his-
8 MiL at 207-9.
9 Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment: The State's Interest Re-evaluated, 51 MINN.
L. REv. 293 (1966). It should be noted, however, that much compulsory medical treatment
is aimed at protection of the community and not the treatment of the individual.
Quarantine and vaccination laws have been upheld as protection against contagious
diseases. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648
(Fla. 1952).
In water fluoridation cases the state's special role of parens patriae for children has
been invoked, Chapman v. Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 So. 2d 142 (1954), as has the fact
that fluoridated water benefits the general public and is not actually compulsory for
the individual, Paduano v. New York, 45 Misc. 2d 718, 257 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
One difficulty with the fluoridation problem is that it cannot be feasibly individualized
so as to except those who do not desire it. See also Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 163
Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E.2d 609 (1955); Note, Legal Aspects of the Fluoridation of Public
Drinking Water, 23 GFo. WASH. L. REv. 343 (1955); Comment, Fluoridation of Public
Wrater Supplies, 3 HAI tNGS L.J. 123 (1952).
The doctrine of parens patriae is invoked for the care of minors. Jehovah's Witnesses
v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S.
598 (1968); People v. Labrenz, 411 IMl. 618, 104 NE.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824
(1952) (blood transfusion for minor); In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552
(1933) (surgical removal of child's eye), noted in 68 U.S.L. REV. 117 (1934). It should be
noted that Mill specifically recognizes the state's special interest in the care and protection
of minors. MILL at 96.
Perhaps the most direct confrontation between Mill's principle and compulsory medical
treatment is presented by the administration of blood transfusions to Jehovah's Wit-
nesses. See notes 88-91 infra and accompanying text.
10 Even though Mill speaks of "human beings in the maturity of their faculties," MILL
at 96, the problem of the harmlessly insane is pertinent. See Comment, Liberty and
Required Mental Health Treatment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1067 (1966). See, e.g., Wills v.
Attorney General, 201 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1953); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Mayock v. Martin, 157 Conn. 56, 245 A.2d 574 (1968), discussed in Comment,
Society's Right to Protect an Individual from Himself, 2 CONN. L. REv. 150 (1969).
11 Intoxicating liquor and drugs are examples. For discussion of the former, see text
accompanying notes 26-42 infra; of the latter, see text accompanying notes 62-64 infra.
12 People v. Peck, 7 N.Y.2d 76, 163 N.E.2d 866, 195 N.Y.S.2d 637, cert. denied, 364
U.S. 662 (1959) (upholding compulsory participation against religious objections).
13 See text accompanying notes 78-85 infra.
14 See, e.g., 3 Wis. ADMx. CoDE §§ 3.07(19), 6.05(3) and Wis. STAT. § 101.28 (1965).
15 Compulsory liability insurance is aimed at the protection of prospective plaintiffs
and does not raise the issue involved in this comment. However, Social Security does raise
the issue.
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torical perspective on the issue, and the other two areas of inquiry
reveal contrasting answers to questions raised in the context of con-
temporary opinion. Before examining these objects of state regulation,
it is appropriate to consider the basis of state regulation of private
conduct.
I. THE STATE'S POLICE POWER
Most state regulation of individual conduct is founded on the police
power, the exercise of which is justified by the interest of the state in
achieving a workable degree of social organization and harmony.0 His-
torically, the police power was not widely exercised, but with the ex-
pansion of government into new areas, the maxim Sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas was relied upon to uphold the increasing reach of
legislation.1 The emphasis on this maxim gradually shifted from a
positive basis for the police power to a negative limitation on its scope,
the latter supposedly following by implication from the former.'8
This maxim remains in current usage,19 but it has been increasingly
replaced by a series of maxims and counter-maxims operating at vari-
ous levels of abstraction in the legal process. At the basic level it is
often stated that the exercise of the state's police power must have a
reasonable relationship to the public safety, health, morals, or general
welfare, both as to the goals of the legislation and as to the means used
to achieve those goals.20 However, this is qualified by the notion that
the legislature has wide discretion in determining what constitutes the
public safety, health, morals, and general welfare, and also what con-
stitutes a reasonable measure to carry out its purposes.2 1 In turn th' s
16 For an extensive early discussion, see 2 T.M. CooLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITmONA'L
LIMITATIONS 1223 (8th ed. 1927) [hereinafter cited as 2 COOLEY].
17 2 CooLry at 1225, 1241; Smead, Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas: A Basis of
the State Police Power, 21 CoaRN. L.Q. 276 (1936). Roughly translated the phrase means:
Use your own property so as not to injure that of another. BI.AcI's LAw DIx"oNARY (4tht
ed. 1951).
18 Smead, supra note 17.
19 See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 354, 158 N.W.2d 72,
74 (1968) (voided statute requiring motorcyclists to wear protective helmets); State v.
Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 694, 114 S.E.2d 660, 664 (1960) (upheld statute requiring licensing of
real estate brokers and salesmen).
20 See, e.g., Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 422, 306 P.2d 601, 603 (Ct.
App. 1957) (voided curfew ordinance); Florida Citrus Comm'n v. Golden Gift, Inc., 91 So.
2d 657, 660 (Fla. 1956) (voided requirement on labeling of orange juice); Kirtley v. State,
227 Ind. 175, 181, 84 N.E.2d 712, 714 (1949) (voided law prohibiting ticket sales at prices
above standard price); People v. Bunis, 9 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 172 N.E.2d 273, 274, 210 N.Y.S.2d
505, 507 (1961) (voided law prohibiting sale of written material from which title page had
been removed); Appeal of Lord, 868 Pa. 121, 129-30, 81 A.2d 533, 537 (1951) (abuse of
discretion by zoning board in refusing to issue permit). 2 COOLEY at 1231.
21 See, e.g., People v. Aguiar, 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 603, 606, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171, 174-5,
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is qualified by the principle of judicial review that the courts must
not abdicate their responsibility in passing upon such legislation.22
Needless to say, this duality may in practice give the courts considerable
leeway in delineating the scope of the police power. Ultimately, the
question of whether and how Mill's criterion affects judicial review of
legislation is to be answered more by the substance of what the courts
have done than by the rhetoric used.
In considering the issues, a distinction must be made between legis-
lationm that is brought to bear on a person other than the party to
be benefited and legislation that bears directly on the person benefited.
For example, statutes requiring automobile manufacturers and deal-
ers to equip all cars with seat belts are within the scope of the police
power since the general public and not the manufacturer or dealer is
sought to be protected.24 However, a statute requiring all persons to
wear seat belts while driving in private vehicles benefits only the per-
son who is restricted by the statute, and the validity of such legislation
falls within the issue posed here. This distinction should be kept in
mind in considering the great expansion of health and welfare legis-
lation of the past century. While the definition of public health, safety,
and welfare has broadened greatly during this period, the legislation
in question has with few exceptions regulated the activity of employers,
manufacturers, sellers, carriers, and landlords, and not the activity of
employees, consumers, purchasers, passengers, and tenants for whose
177 (Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 970 (1968) (upheld prohibition of the possession
of marijuana); Levy v. State, 250 La. 25, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1966),
(upheld statute denying illegitimate children the right to recover for wrongful death of
their mother); rev'd, 391 US. 68 (1968); Stepp v. State, 202 Miss. 725, 731, 32 So. 2d 447,
448 (1947), suggestion of error overruled, 202 Miss. 725, 33 So. 2d 307 (1948) (upheld
prohibition of possession of intoxicating liquors); Ex parte Fowler, 85 Old. Crim. 64,
78-74, 184 P.2d 814, 819 (1947) (upheld statute permitting involuntary confinement for
venereal disease). 2 CooLY at 1228, 1231.
22 See, eg., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 358, 158 N.W.2d 72,
76 (1968) (voided requirement of protective helmets for motorcyclists); State v. Williams,
146 N.C. 618, 624, 61 S.E. 61, 63 (1908) (voided prohibition of possession of intoxicating
liquors); State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, 148, 10 S.E. 283, 284 (1889) (voided prohibition
of possession of intoxicating liquors). E. FRxUND, Porucn Powmt 13-16 (1904).
23 While the term "legislation" will be frequently used to describe government action,
this comment is not confined to state action through legislation but encompasses govern-
ment action through judicial and administrative orders as well. However, the area of
private civil action is not included. Thus the designation of failure to use seat belts as
contributory negligence in some jurisdictions does not fall within the scope of this
comment.
24 While it is true that the buyer is thus compelled to pay for seat belts, he is not
liable to a fine for nonuse. This is more market regulation than regulation of conduct.
In another vein, the nonuse of seatbelts as a basis for contributory negligence in tort cases
is not a regulation of conduct but a guideline for deciding equities as between the
private parties.
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benefit the legislation was passed.25 Even with the vast reach of welfare
legislation, most of this legislation would not contradict Mill's precepts.
II. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON THE POLICE POWER
A. An Historical Process: Intoxicating Liquors
One traditional concern of the state police power has been the regula-
tion of intoxicating liquors. Prohibition or regulation of the sale or
manufacture for sale of intoxicating liquor falls within the scope of
restricting the conduct of the few for the protection of the general
public; however, statutes affecting the manufacture or possession of li-
quor for one's own use are not of the same character. Early commentators
stated that the police power did not extend to the regulation of a person
becoming intoxicated in private. 26 There was strong state judicial support
for such a thesis at that time,27 and Mill was extensively quoted by at
least one court.28 Before quoting Mill, the court in Commonwealth v.
Campbell29 paraphrased Mill's principle:
25 For a discussion of this legislation, see Brown, Police Power-Legislation for Health
and Personal Safety, 42 HARv. L. REv. 866 (1929) (especially the summary at 896-7).
26 E. FREUND, POLICE PowER 484 (1904):
It is . . . significant that the policy of prohibition stops short of dealing with
the private act of consumption.
C. TIEDEMANN, LIMITATIONs OF POLICE PowER 151, 302 (1886):
It cannot be made a legal wrong for one to become intoxicated in the privacy of
his room, when the limitation upon his means does not make drunkenness an
extravagance .... If a man displays his drunkenness on the public thoroughfares
to the annoyance and inconvenience of the public, he can be punished therefore.
But if he choose to degrade himself in his own home or apartments by
intoxication, he commits no offense against the public, and is consequently not
subject to police regulation.
Professor Freund in his general discussion of liquor control states:
If [protection from temptation] were the sole justification for the control of the
liquor traffic, there would be great force in the objection that it runs counter
to fundamental principles of individual liberty; strong reliance is therefore placed
upon the ulterior dangers to the community at large from the existence of
intemperance in its midst.
FREUND at 192.
27 Commonwealth v. Campbell, 133 Ky. 50, 117 S.W. 383 (1909); City of Carthage v.
Block, 139 Mo. App.-,386, 123 S.W. 483 (1909); State v. Williams, 146 N.C. 618, 61 S.E. 61
(1908); State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, 10 S.E. 283 (1889). In an annotation of Common-
wealth v. Campbell, supra, it is stated:
In accordance with the view expressed in the reported case, it has been held
generally that the mere possession of intoxicating liquor, kept for one's own use,
is not inherently injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the public; and,
therefore, that legislation prohibiting such keeping in possession is not a legitimate
exercise of police power, but, on the contrary, is an abridgment of the privileges
and immunities of the citizen without any legal justification, and, as such, void.
Eidge v. Bessemer, 164 Ala. 599, 51 So. 246, followed in French v. Birmingham,
(Ala.) 51 So. 254; Sullivan v. Oneida, 61 Ill. 242; State v. McIntyre, 139 N.C. 599,
52 S.E. 63; State v. Williams, 146 N.C. 618, 14 Ann. Cas. 562, 61 S.E. 61, 17
L.R.A.N.S. 299; Titsworth v. State, 2 Okla. Crim. 268, 101 Pac. 288; State v.
Gilman, 33 IV. Va. 146, 10 S.E. 283, 6 L.R.A. 847.
19 ANN. CAS. 163.
28 Commonwealth v. Campbell, 133 Ky. 50, 59-61, 117 S.W. 383, 386-7 (1909).
29 133 Ky. 50, 117 S.W. 383 (1909).
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[T]he question of what a man will drink, or eat, or own, pro-
vided the rights of others are not invaded, is one which ad-
dresses itself alone to the will of the citizen. It is not within
the competency of government to invade the privacy of a
citizen's life and to regulate his conduct in matters in which
he alone is concerned, or to prohibit him any liberty the exer-
cise of which will not directly injure society30
And the court in City of Carthage v. Block,3 1 while not citing Mill,
echoed his criterion:
If the ordinance under consideration had been.., limited to
the streets and alleys and public places, it could be upheld as
being reasonable.... [T]o say that the city may prohibit drink-
ing in places not open to the public... would be to allow it
to encroach upon the private rights which all governments
should hold sacred... 2
The leading Supreme Court decision of the period, Mugler v. Kan-
sas,33 held that Kansas could prohibit the manufacture of liquor for
one's own use, but on the grounds that the state had found it to be
a measure necessary to the adequate enforcement of other legislation
against public sale and manufacture.34 Indeed, the Court stated:
The argument made . . . is, that in the implied compact
between the State and the citizen certain rights are reserved
by the latter, which are guaranteed by the constitutional pro-
vision protecting persons against being deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law, and with which the
State cannot interfere; that among those rights is that of manu-
facturing for one's use either food or drink; and that while,
according to the doctrines of the Commune, the State may
control the tastes, appetites, habits, dress, food, and drink of
the people, our system of government, based upon the individ-
uality and intelligence of the citizen, does not claim to control
him, except as to his conduct to others, leaving him the sole
judge as to all that only affects himself.
It will be observed that the proposition, and the argument
made in support of it, equally concede that the right to manu-
facture drink for one's personal use is subject to the condition
that such manufacture does not endanger or affect the rights
of others. If such manufacture does prejudicially affect the
rights and interests of the community, it follows, from the
80 Id. at 58, 117 S.W. at 385.
31 139 Mo. App. 386, 123 S.W. 488 (1909).
32 Id. at 392-3, 123 S.W. at 485.
33 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
84 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887).
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very premises stated, that society has the power to protect
itself, by legislation, against the injurious consequences of
that business. 85
While the Supreme Court was granting discretion to state legislatures,
certain state courts were equating Mill's principle with constitutional
limitations on the police power, at least as concerns liquor. In so doing
the state courts, in order to avoid a conflict with Mugler, were develop-
ing a distinction between possession of liquor with intent to sell and
possession of liquor for one's own use.36
At this time the prohibition movement was growing into national
proportions. The prohibitionists characterized intemperance as evil
not only in the individual concerned but also as a danger affecting all
those around him.37 In an atmosphere of increasing public opposition
to the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Supreme Court in Crane v.
Campbell38s extended its "enforcement-of-other-regulations" doctrine to
35 Id. at 660. The Mugler decision as a whole was taken by several later courts to
stand for the proposition that, in the absence of a reasonable relation to the public
welfare, a statute would be void. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 851,
355, 158 N.W.2d 72, 74 (1968); State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, 149, 10 S.E. 283, 284 (1889).
86 State v. Williams, 146 N.C. 618, 633, 61 S.E. 61, 66 (1908):
Viewed from any possible point of view, the sole question is, what, if any, relation
has the act of carrying into the county of Burke, in any one day, more than one-
half gallon of vinous, spiritous or malt liquors, in said county, to the sale of
such liquor? In view of the numerous uses to which that quantity of such liquor
may be put other than selling, and of the improbability of any reasonable person
carrying into the county the prohibited quantity for sale, can it be insisted that
any such real or substantial relation to the sale exists?
State v. Gilman, 83 W. Va. 146, 151, 10 S.E. 283, 285 (1889):
A very different question would be presented if the act had made it unlawful
for any person to keep intoxicating liquors in his possession ... for the purpose
of selling it, or as a device to evade the revenue laws.
In Gilman the defendant had less than five gallons, and in Williams, though unspecified,
the quantity seemed to be not much over the half-gallon cutoff point; in Mugler the
defendant was running a brewery.
37 See, e.g., W.F. CRAFTs, WHY DRY? (1918); A. SINCLAIR, PROHMITION 50-74 (1965);
PROCEamINGS OF THra SmNTH NATIONAL CONvENTION OF THE ANTr-SALoON LoAGUE OF
AmEaucA 19, 56-63, 68, 73, 84-87, 215-8 (1915); PROCEEDINGS or THE FIFEENTH NATIONAL
CONVENTION OF TH ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE or AmERucA 28-29, 30-31, 239-46 (1913). The
House of Representatives set aside December 22, 1914 for debate on the passage of the
eighteenth amendment. 52 CoNG. REc. 495-616 (1914). A comprehensive list of the
"dangers" of alcohol to society was presented by Rep. Hobson. Id. at 604-7. Random
samples of other comments include:
It is charged against the liquor traffic that it is responsible for 50 per cent of
the crime in the United States.
Id. at 497 (Rep. Campbell); and:
It is almost universally admitted that the liquor business is the greatest evil
in existence; that it is the greatest source of crime, immorality, disease, idleness,
poverty, and national waste; and that it is highly detrimental and injurious to the
social, economic, and moral welfare of our citizens.
Id. at 517 (Rep. Morgan).
For an anti-prohibition view, see C. DARaow, THE PROHmBITIOn MANIA (1927).
8 245 U.S. 804 (1917). See 2 A.L.R. 1085 (1919).
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include the prohibition of the possession of liquor for one's own use.
This was later extended in Samuels v. McCurdy"9 also to encompass
the possession of liquor legally obtained before prohibition, where the
Court justified the legislation in these terms:
It is obvious that if men are permitted to maintain liquor in
their possession, though only for their own consumption, there
is danger of its becoming accessible to others. Legislation
making possession unlawful is therefore within the police
power of the States as a reasonable mode of regulating the
evils of drunkenness.40
The philosophy of the earlier state decisions on constitutional guaran-
tees akin to Mill's precepts was voiced in the dissenting opinion, which
attacked the majority's acceptance of the purported relation between
private consumption and the public welfare.41
This shift in judicial attitude toward liquor legislation is not readily
explained in the context of Mill's principle. It might be argued that
the courts were not rejecting Mill's philosophy, but were merely ac-
cepting legislative findings of fact and recognizing the then current
popular feeling that individual consumption of liquor did have a
substantial effect upon the community. It might also be suggested that
although Mill's criterion was accepted in certain categories of conduct,
it was not accepted in others, and that the public conception of liquor
shifted from the former categories to the latter. For example, if Mill's
principle were not accepted with regard to the enforcement of morality,
the strong popular tide to classify the consumption of liquor as immoral
would merely extend the police power with regard to liquor without
affecting the limitations in those categories of behavior considered
amoral. Finally it might be argued that the decisions were a frontal
assault on Mill's criterion and that they established the state's right
to interfere in private conduct as long as no explicit constitutional
rights were infringed.42 This last result has never been suggested by
later courts as a broad principle.
39 267 U.S. 188 (1925).
40 Id. at 198 (emphasis supplied).
41 Id. at 202-3. Among later cases following the majority position are: Young v. State,
167 Ga. 165, 144 SE. 726 (1928); Stepp v. State, 202 Miss. 725, 32 So. 2d 447 (1947).
suggestion of error overruled, 202 Miss. 725, 33 So. 2d 807 (1948).
42 Bruce, The Private Stock of Liquor and the Inherent Right of Self-Destruction, 20
ILL. L. Rr v. 757 (1926). This early commentator, in discussing Samuels v. McCurdy, dealt
directly with the question implicitly posed by this comment-the relation, if any,
between Mill's philosophy and constitutional limitations on police power. He concluded,
in effect, that the public welfare was so broad as to encompass all health and safety
measures without restriction, and Mill's philosophy has become obsolete. Bruce at 760-3.
1970]
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B. A Contemporary Debate: Motorcycle Helmets
The majority of states in recent years have required the use of
safety helmets by motorcyclists and their passengers.43 On first impres-
sion this helmet requirement appears to be solely to reduce possible
head injuries to the motorcycling community and hence to be an
exercise of state power over individual conduct which is inconsistent
with Mill's criterion. Those affected by such legislation have vigorously
argued Mill's principle to the courts with varying results. Two of the
statutes were invalidated;4 and three more were temporarily under a
cloud before appellate courts reversed.45 But the majority of courts have
upheld the statutes as a valid exercise of the police power.46
Professor Bruce based his conclusion for the scope of the police power on the landmark
case of Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), which upheld a statute limiting the
employment of minors to eight hours a day. Bruce at 769. It is quite true, as he asserted,
that this decision recognized the state's concern for the individual and particular classes
as opposed to society in general. In this sense the decision greatly expanded the definition
of what constitutes the public welfare. On this point Professor Bruce deprecated the
decision in In re Morgan, 58 P. 1071 (Colo. 1899), which voided a somewhat similar statute.
Bruce at 769. However, one crucial difference must be pointed out between the two cases-
the statute in Holden v. Hardy was enforced against the employer, while that in In re
Morgan was enforced against the employee. Mill himself would not deny the states' power
to enact legislation acting on employers for the protection of employees, although he
might differ on the economic wisdom of such legislation. MnL at 203. Professor Bruce
also takes the unusual stand that the passage of the eighteenth amendment indicated that
the prohibition of the consumption of liquor was previously constitutional. Bruce at
774. By definition, amendments are usually passed to change the Constitution.
But while it is conceded that the scope of the public welfare and the reach of the
police power have been greatly expanded in the last century, it does not necessarily follow
that the distinction between government action bearing on others than those to be
protected and action bearing directly on those to be protected has been abolished. In
essence, the early commentator seems to have confused Mill's philosophy on the wisdom
of certain state action with his philosophy on the limitations on state action. Bruce at
767-9. The latter philosophy did not concern the question of what constituted the public
welfare but rather the question of state interference with conduct which did not
substantially affect other persons. While the questions are related as discussed previously,
they are not identical. The force of Mill's philosophy on state limitations remains intact
even as the scope of the public welfare increases with the growing complexity and
interaction of society.
Nor has Professor Bruce's certainty been shared by the courts. The latest series in the
dialogue, the motorcycle helmet cases, illustrates a sharp division on the subject among
the state courts even now. See text at notes 43-53 infra. It seems safe to say that, even if
Mill is not in the spotlight, his influence is still felt.
43 Comment, Constitutionality of Mandatory Motorcycle Helmet Legislation, 73 DICK.
L. REv. 100, 101 n.8 (1969) (listing statutes).
44 People v. Fries, 42 Ill. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969); American Motorcycle Ass'n v.
Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968), noted in 18 DRAKE L. Rxv. 124 (1968),
67 Mic. L. RFv. 360 (1968), 71 W. VA. L. Rv. 191 (1969), and 1969 Wis. L. R. v 320.
45 State v. Eitel, 227 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1969) (reversing lower court); Everhardt v. City of
New Orleans, 208 So. 2d 423 (La. Ct. App. 1968), aff'd mem., 252 La. 269, 210 So. 2d
508 (1968), rev'd, 253 La. 285, 217 So. 2d 400 (1968) (4-3 decision), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 212
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The strict numerical box score, however, scratches only the surface.
Most of the majority courts have displayed a marked hesitance explicitly
to reject Mill, but have instead attacked the assumption that the helmet
requirement is solely for the benefit of the wearer. The strongest
rationale proferred is that given dense, high-speed traffic conditions,
helmets protect the cyclist from stones or other objects propelled by
the wheels of other vehicles and thus prevent accidents involving others
which might result if the cyclist were to lose control when hit by such
a projectile.47 Other considerations raised include the desire to stay the
cost of insurance48 and the fear that severe head injuries may cause the
cyclist and his dependents to become public charges. 49 This last argu-
ment was refuted by a Michigan court which echoed Mill's underlying
concern:
The Attorney General further contends that the State has
an interest in the "viability" of its citizens and can legislate
to keep them healthy and self-supporting. This logic would
lead to unlimited paternalism.60
(1969); People v. Carmichael, 53 Misc. 2d 584, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Genesee County Ct. Spec.
Sess. 1967), rev'd, 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Genesee County Ct. 1968). See People
v. Smallwood, 52 Misc. 2d 1027, 277 N.YS.2d 429 (Monroe County Ct. Spec. Sess. 1967)
(voided statute as infringement of freedom to dress as one pleases, but decision not ap-
pealed by prosecutor).
46 State v. Burzycki, 37 US.L.V. 2448 (Conn. Cir. Ct.), appeal denied, 252 A.2d 312
(Conn. 1969); Commonwealth v. Howie, 238 N.E2d 373 (Mass. 1968), cert. denied, 393
US. 999 (1968), noted in 36 TENN. L. REv. 405 (1969); State v. Mele, 103 N.J. Super. 353,
247 A.2d 176 (Hudson County Ct. 1968); State v. Krammes, 105 N.J. Super. 345, 252 A.2d
223 (Super. Ct.), cert. denied, 54 N.J. 257, 254 A.2d 800 (1969); Kraft v. New York, 38
US.L.W. 3134 (N.Y. City Ct. Onondaga County), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 24 (1969); People
v. Newhouse, 55 Misc. 2d 1064, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Ithaca City Ct. 1968): People v. Schmidt,
54 Misc. 2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Erie County Ct. 1967), appeal dismissed, 23 N.Y.2d 686,
243 N.E.2d 153, 295 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1968); People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 282
N.Y.S.2d 797 (Buffalo City Ct. 1967); State v. Anderson, 3 N.C. App. 124, 164 S.E.2d 48
(1968), aff'd, 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49 (1969); State v. Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d 677 (N.D.
1969); State v. Craig, 19 Ohio App. 2d 29, 249 N.E.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1969); State v.
Fetterly, 456 P.2d 996 (Ore. 1969); State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 241 A.2d 625 (R.I.
1968); Ex parte Smith, 441 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis.
2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 709 (1969); see also cases cited supra note 32.
Comment, State's Power to Require an Individual to Protect Himself, 26 WAsH. & Lsn L.
Rnv. 112 (1969).
47 E.g., State v. Fetterly, 456 P.2d 996 (Ore. 1969).
48 State v. Anderson, 3 N.C. App. 124, 128, 164 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1968), af'd, 275 N.C. 168,
166 S.E.2d 49 (1969).
It is interesting to speculate whether the pooling of risks in itself would make conduct,
otherwise protected under Mill's criterion, subject to regulation.
49 People v. Newhouse, 55 Misc. 2d 1064, 1065-6, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715 (Ithaca City Ct.
1968).
50 American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72, 75 (1968).
A New York Court reasoned:
[Mit can be argued that the statute here questioned affects public welfare because
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Another court, to counter the cyclist's reliance on Mill, itself referred
to Mill to support its conclusion that the cyclist's death would have a
substantial effect on others:
The unwilling cyclists must obey this law. We admire John
Stuart Mill's Essay on Liberty, which their counsel cite to
persuade us that the State of Florida has unconstitutionally
infringed Eitel's and Thompson's right to be let alone. But
Mill said there that "no person is an entirely isolated being;
it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or per-
manently hurtful to himself without mischief reaching at least
to his near connections, and often far beyond them." If he
falls we cannot leave him lying in the road. The legislature
may constitutionally conclude that the cyclist's right to be let
alone is no more precious than the corresponding right of
ambulance drivers, nurses and neurosurgeons.5 1
Several of the courts did, however, explicitly reject Mill with regard
to the prevention of physical harm,52 while some of the more hesitant
if a person suffers injury that could have been avoided by wearing a protective
helmet, that person will perhaps become a public charge because of a disabling
injury and that those who have been dependent upon that person for support
may also become a public charge. The possibility and even likelihood of this
happening cannot be denied. If a statute required every person to refrain from
smoking there could be no serious argument that many persons would be spared
crippling illnesses that cause premature disability and death. If a statute required
every person to retire to bed by 10:00 p.m. every evening it would probably benefit
the general health of many citizens. A court cannot say as a matter of law that
there is no public benefit from a statute requiring motorcyclists to wear a
protective helmet, or a statute requiring all persons to refrain from smoking, or
a statute requiring all persons to retire to bed by 10:00 p.m. every evening.
To state this argument and concede that it has weight does not decide the
issue. If the fact that this argument has validity were taken to decide a question
such as presented by this case, then it would justify almost any rule imposed by
the legislature, for our society is so complex today that there are very few things
that cannot be said to affect some other person or the public treasury. If this
argument were to decide questions such as presented by this case, then the
hypothetical statute requiring people to go to bed early would be valid. But such
an argument does not decide the question but merely poses one factor to be
considered with other factors.
The statute challenged in this case has the direct effect of protecting the physical
well being of the person who is subject to the mandate of the statute, and the
indirect effect of protecting other persons from the burdens that might result
from the death or disability of the person subject to the mandate; the direct
effect is to safeguard the motorcyclist and the indirect effect the prevention of
the motorcyclist and his dependents from becoming public charges.
As the police power is understood by this court it justifies the regulation of the
conduct of one person because of the effect of that conduct upon other persons.
Therefore the police power does not justify the statute on the basis of the direct
effect alone. Is the indirect effect such that the police power authorizes the
statute?
In the opinion of this court it is not.
People v. Carmichael, 53 Misc. 2d 584, 588, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272, 277 (Genesee County Ct. Spec.
Sess. 1967), rev'd, 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Genesee County Ct. 1968).
51 State v. Eitel, 227 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1969).
52 State v. Mele, 103 N.J. Super. 353, 355, 247 A.2d 176, 178 (Hudson County Ct. 1968)
("the state has an interest in attempting to protect people from the consequences of their
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only thinly veiled their rejection.5 3 But despite these latter cases,
it does appear that Mill's precepts exert a restraining influence even on
those courts which disagree with the cyclists, especially when the dis-
agreement goes to the application and not to the precepts themselves.
To these courts the main difficulty is in drawing the line between
conduct affecting others and conduct which does not. As in the liquor
cases, the line is not drawn at the same point by all courts.
C. Private Obscenity: Overtones of Mill?
The Supreme Court has been consistent in denying first amendment
protection to obscenity, although the definition of obscenity has been
less than crystal clear.54 In Stanley v. Georgia,55 however, the Court,
while reiterating its former denials of protection to obscenity, held
that the possession of obscenity for personal use and consumption was
constitutionally beyond regulation or prohibition by the state. Although
the decision was grounded on freedom of speech, the earlier un-
equivocal rejection of obscenity as protected speech seems to indicate
that the Court was influenced by principles akin to Mill's:
For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very
limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intru-
sions into one's privacy....
These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the case
before us. He is asserting the right to read or observe what
he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional
needs in the privacy of his own home.581
The distinction made by the Court is very similar to the distinction
made in the early liquor cases between possession for sale and possession
for private use.57 Indeed, the Court explicitly rejected the contention
(which was accepted with respect to liquor in Mugler v. Kansas5s) that
own carelessness'); People v. Carmichael, 56 Misc. 2d 388, 390, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931, 935
(Genesee County Ct. 1968) (state's interest in maintaining healthy, robust citizens).
53 People v. Newhouse, 55 Misc. 2d 1064, 1065-6, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715 (Ithaca City Ct.
1968) (state's interest in keeping citizens from becoming public charges); State ex Tel.
Colvin v. Lombardi, 241 A.2d 625, 627 (R.I. 1968).
54 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957).
55 394 U.S. 557, 563 (1969).
58 Id. at 549.
57 None of the statements cited by the Court in Roth for the proposition that
"this Court has always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms
of speech and press" were made in the context of a statute punishing mere
prte possession of obscene material; the cases cited deal for the most partwihthe use of the mails to distribute objectionable material or with some form
of public distribution or dissemination.
394 U.S. 557, 560 (1969).
58 123 U.S. 623 (1887), discussed in text at notes 33-35 supra.
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prohibition of the possession of obscenity is a necessary incident to
statutory schemes prohibiting distribution. 9 The Court also rejected
not only the assertion that exposure to obscenity may lead to crimes of
sexual violence, but also the relevance of such an assertion to controlling
the private consumption of ideas and information.60
The decision itself was quite narrow, perhaps out of reluctance to
give broad scope to the principles implicit in the opinion. But it does
suggest that in analogous cases the Court might consider an argument
based on Mill's criterion, especially if there is a particular constitutional
clause on which to pin the decision.
III. SOME REFLECTIONS ON MILL'S INFLUENCE ON THE COURTS
Several pervasive considerations underlie the judicial reaction in the
three areas discussed above, and it is to these considerations that the
discussion will now turn.
A. Deference to Legislative Findings of Fact
As noted above, 1 one problem in analyzing courts' reaction to Mill's
principle is the frequent deference shown to the legislative process by
the courts. State legislatures in passing measures for the public welfare
have traditionally exercised a fact-finding role, whether explicit or
implicit, in determining what constitutes the public welfare and what
means are reasonable to achieve the desired goal. If a legislature finds
that certain conduct is dangerous to the public welfare and proscribes
such conduct, and if the courts defer to the legislature without question-
ing the validity of such finding, an individual defendant is precluded
from successfully raising an argument analogous to Mill's.
This process of deference to the legislature's fact finding is exempli-
fied by decisions upholding statutes proscribing the possession and use
of certain drugs.62 While advocates of these drugs protest either that
the use of the drugs is not harmful, or if harmful, then only to the user,
the factual nature of this protest is usually rejected by legislatures which
proclaim the commonly held conception that the very nature of drug
addiction predisposes the user to serious forms of crime against others,
that the use of milder drugs eventually leads to addiction to more
69 394 U.S. 557, 563 (1969).
60 Id. at 567.
-1 See text at notes 21, 34-35, 41 supra.
62 See, e.g., Borras v. State, 229 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1969); Commonwealth v. Leis, 243
N.E.2d 898 (Mass. 1969); People v. Victor, 62 Cal. 2d 280, 398 P.2d 391, 42 Cal. Rptr.
199 (1965); People v. Aguiar, 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 970 (1968); People v. Glaser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 819, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1965).
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potent narcotics, and that a person under the influence of drugs is
dangerous to those around him.63 The validity of these common pre-
sumptions may be questioned, but if found by the legislature, there is
little question that they present sufficient basis for the exercise of the
police power, and the courts usually do defer to such legislative findings
concerning drugs. 4
This deference to the legislature's fact finding was evidenced to a
certain degree in the liquor cases as the influence of the temperance
lobby made itself felt in the then popular conception of liquor as
undermining the fabric of society.65 It was also evidenced in several of
the motorcycle helmet decisions.,6 Other examples include determina-
tions of what are contagious diseases for quarantine purposes,67 what
are proper conditions for the imposition of curfews, 68 and what are
reasonable means of preventing illegitimate births0 9
The result of this deference to the legislature is that where the issue
of socially harmless conduct may be presented, it is possible for courts
to avoid it by deference to insubstantial or inaccurate legislative findings
of fact. This, of course, raises the question of the power of the courts
to overrule patently insubstantial or inaccurate findings of fact, but the
63 See authorities cited note 62 supra. Indeed, in a Mill-oriented opinion, a lower
court stated:
There are statutes that regulate a citizen in matters that affect his own health.
For example, the citizen is restricted in the use of alcohol and narcotics. However
it must be noted such restriction is not the exercise of the police power to make
a citizen maintain himself in a state of physical and mental well being so that
other persons may not be deprived of sharing in the fruits of his good health; it
is the exercise of the police power to protect other persons from the harmful
conduct of citizens whose behavior toward others is affected by the use of alcohol
or narcotics.
People v. Carmichael, 53 Misc. 2d 584, 589-90, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272, 278 (Genesee County
Ct. Spec. Sess. 1967) (voiding motorcycle helmet requirement), rev'd, 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288
N.Y.S.2d 931 (Genesee County Ct. 1968). However, an early decision, Ah Lim v.
Territory, I Wash. St. 156, 24 P. 588 (1890), upheld a statute prohibiting the smoking or
inhaling of opium on the grounds that any detriment to the opium user would be
visited upon the public in general by the user becoming a public charge either as a
pauper or as an imbecile.
For the opposing view, see Note, The California Marijuana Possession Statute: An
Infringement on the Rights of Privacy or Other Peripheral Constitutional Rights?, 19
HASTINGs LJ. 758 (1968).
64 See authorities cited note 62 supra.
65 See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
66 See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 3 N.C. App. 124, 126, 164 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1968), aff'd, 275
N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49 (1969); Ex parte Smith, 441 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
67 Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. State Ed. of Health, 186 U.S. 380
(1902); Ex parte Fowler, 85 Okl. Crim. 64, 184 P.2d 814 (1947).
68 See, e.g., State v. Boles, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22, 240 A.2d 920 (1967).
69 Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1966), rev'd, 391 US. 68 (1968). For
a discussion of the legislative purpose in this case, see Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate
Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decision on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36
U. Cm. L. REv. 338, 346-7 (1969).
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crux of the problem for present consideration is what the courts'
deference signifies. It may indicate literal deference, or it may be a
mere ploy for rejecting Mill's criterion and for upholding statutes which
the courts deem constitutional even if the statutes are solely for the
protection of the person prosecuted. This latter may be especially true
if the court itself suggests what it considers to be the implicit finding
of fact and purpose of the legislature.70 Whether such evasion of the
issue exists in a particular case is, of course, a highly speculative inquiry
into the circumstances of that case, but it is nevertheless important to
acknowledge the ever present opportunity for such judicial side-stepping
of the issue raised by Mill's principle.
B. Substantiality of Relation to Public Welfare
Theoretically there is very little, if any, individual conduct that
does not affect other people. Even acts done in absolute privacy with
no immediately harmful results can be said to mold certain personality
traits which will sooner or later manifest themselves in social relations.
Hence, the issue is how the courts have dealt with the regulation of
conduct which does not substantially affect others. Substantiality in-
volves the probability of effect as well as the degree to which the other
persons are affected.
The meaning of "substantial" is by its very nature ambiguous.
A broad usage of the word would dilute, if not completely negate,
any individual rights falling within the scope of Mill's principle. The
classic example of such dilution is the argument that the state has
a direct and valid interest in every aspect of an individual's well-being
since his lack of well-being might diminish the public economic out-
put.71 This type of dilution magnifies the impact of individual conduct
on society as a whole and would seemingly justify state regulation of
every aspect of human behavior.
Another type of dilution occurs when probabilities are magnified
to find a substantial relation between an individual's conduct and its
possible effect on others. An example of this type of dilution would be
an argument in support of the required use of seat belts to the effect
that the ejection of passengers in an automobile collision is apt to
cause secondary accidents by vehicles attempting to avoid the ejected
passengers. Whether the courts actually believe that such causal chains
70 See, e.g., State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 241 A2d 625 (R.I. 1968).
71 This is an extension of the argument that the state must protect the individual
from himself so that he does not become a public charge. People v. Carmichael, 56 Misc.
2d 388, 390, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931, 935 (Genesee County Ct. 1968); People v. Newhouse, 55
Misc. 2d 1064, 1065-6, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715 (Ithaca City Ct. 1968); Ah Lim v. Territory,
1 Wash. St. 156, 164, 24 P. 588, 590 (1890) (discussed in note 63 supra).
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are substantial is open to question. It may well be that such causal
chains are employed only to camouflage a rejection of Mill's criterion
in certain cases without resorting to an explicit statement by which
the courts may not wish to be bound.
But no matter what definition is given to the term "substantial,"
the fact that the question is always one of degree raises an inherent
difficulty with Mill's principle-where does one draw the line and
what factors are relevant in drawing that line? One approach would
consider only the state's interest in protecting others without regard to
the degree of infringement on the individual's freedom of conduct. This
yardstick is implicit in Mill's reliance on personal eccentricities as
examples of the type of individual conduct to which his criterion would
apply. Under this approach the slight inconvenience to the motor-
cyclist 72 would be equivalent to the much greater restrictions which
result from the prohibition of certain religious practices7 3 at least as
regards the individual's interest.
An alternative approach would balance the state's interest against
the individual's interest in freedom of conduct. This approach was used
explicitly in several of the motorcycle helmet cases.74 A similar balancing
seems to have occurred in Stanley v. Georgia. The state's interest is the
same in prohibiting the possession of obscenity both for sale and for
private use;75 however, the right of the individual to receive ideas,
regardless of their social worth, was deemed more fundamental than
the right to propagate those ideas.76
Regardless of which of the above approaches is taken, the problem
of where to strike the balance remains. Popularly elected legislatures
seldom exercise the police power in a blatantly offensive manner,77
72 Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis. 2d 42, 53, 165 N.W.2d 377, 383, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 709
(1969) (personal liberty of cyclist not inconsequential).
73 For example, the prohibition of the use of snakes in religious ceremonies, State v.
Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 SYE.2d 179 (1949), appeal dismissed sub nom. Bunn v. North
Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972
(1942); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948); or the prohibition of the
use of peyote, People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964)
(holding the prohibition unconstitutional as applied to members of the Native American
Church).
74 See, e.g., State v. Fetterly, 456 P.2d 996, 997 (Ore. 1969).
75 See L. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUm. L.
REv. 391 (1963).
76 The Court stated: "This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their
social worth, is fundamental to our society." 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (emphasis added).
77 For example, a requirement that every person receive a minimum of eight hours
sleep a night or that every person refrain from consuming beyond a certain number of
calories per day, regardless of problems of enforcement, would seem clearly unconstitu-
tional. See People v. Carmichael, 53 Misc. 2d 584, 589, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272, 277 (Genesee
County Ct. Spec. Sess. 1967), rev'd, 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Genesee County Ct.
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however, and most contested regulations of conduct will not clearly
fall on one side of whatever line is drawn. Hence, if the balancing is
to retain any vitality, it will require that courts be willing to examine
the underlying rationale of the legislatures.
C. A Sliding Scale
The states have long deemed it within their power to punish
deviation from conventional sexual mores.7 Except for statutes forbid-
ding acts of force, openly public displays, and conduct involving minors
(all of which Mill concedes to be the valid object of regulation7 9),
proscription of such deviation appears solidly to contradict Mill's tenets.
However, Lord Devlin, one of the chief proponents of the legal en-
forcement of morality, avers that such proscription is vital to the exis-
tence of society in that society is held together by a pervasive moral
fabric and a weakening of that fabric would cause the breakdown of
societal institutions.80 The validity of this proposition has been ques-
tioned in general,"' and its applicability to private acts within the
framework of marriage is even more dubious.
There are still many statutes proscribing a vast range of sexual
behavior.8 2 The origin of these statutes is traceable to the influence of
1968). In light of recent efforts to reduce cigarette smoking, it is interesting to speculate
whether cigarette smoking is more analogous to the preceding hypotheticals than to the
use of marijuana.
78 People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967); Rhinehart v.
Washington, 70 Wash. 2d 649, 424 P.2d 906 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967). For
an excellent view of some of the statutes on the books in fairly recent times, see Note,
Post-Kinsey, Voluntary Sex Relations as Criminal Offenses, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 162 (1949).
On homosexuality, see Cantor, Deviation and the Criminal Law, 55 J. Caum. L. 441 (1964);
Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforce-
ment and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.LA.L. REv. 643 (1966); Note,
Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and Its Enforcement, 70 YAE L.J.
623 (1961).
79 Acts of force and openly public displays obviously infringe upon the rights of
others; as to minors, see MILL at 96.
80 Sm PATRicK DEVLIN, THE ]ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 9-13 (1965).
81 Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1967).
See also H.L.A. HART, THE MORALrry OF THE CRIMINAL LAw (1965); H.L.A. HART, LAW,
LIBERTY AND MoRALrry (1963). For discussion of Devlin, Hart, and Mill, see Dworkin,
Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 Y.LE L.J. 986 (1966); Symposium, The
Philosophy of H. L. A. Hart, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1967); Comment, Private Consensual
Adult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality,
14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 581 (1967).
82 See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 288a (Deering 1961); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.14 (1964);
WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.100 (1961); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-13 (1965). These cited
statutes proscribe conduct which Kinsey described as common among married couples;
the statutes do not mention any exceptions for married couples. In addition most states
proscribe adultery and fornication in varying degrees, and incest and homosexuality
(usually described under the phrase "crime against nature" or a similar ambiguous phrase)
completely.
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religion on law and politics in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies.83 This influence, which will be labelled the "morality effect,"8 4
uses secular legal institutions to proscribe conduct which offends the
morals of certain groups regardless of whether the offender is a member
of such groups. The morality effect is strongest when the conduct to
be proscribed is most closely related to the religious principles of the
majority of the population, and it diminishes the less religiously offen-
sive the conduct becomes.8 5 It may or may not operate as the sole basis
for a regulation of "morally offensive" conduct. The result of the
morality effect is most vivid in the area of sexual mores, but it was
also evident in the Prohibitionist movement which acquired a highly
religious flavor.8 6
On the other hand, the states have seldom interfered directly with
a competent87 individual's care of his personal health.8 8 For instance,
in the much litigated field of compulsory blood transfusions to patients
near death, the established rule appears to be that blood transfusions
cannot be administered over a patient's refusal, no matter how urgently
needed, unless minor children are involved or the patient is incompe-
tent.8 9 Although the individual's right to refuse blood transfusions is
upheld primarily on freedom of religion grounds,90 it is submitted that
a person should also have the right to refuse medical aid solely on a
conscientious basis.91 In any event, refusal of medical aid is usually
83 See Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era:
An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 450 (1967).
84 Some may prefer the term "puritanism."
85 See Henkin, supra note 61, on obscenity. Any particular conduct may itself become
morally less offensive as the religious climate changes. This is seen in the policy decision
to repeal some of the older sex laws. In Illinois, for example, private consensual behavior
is no longer a criminal offense. Compare ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, art. 11 (1967), with ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 141 (1953).
86 See, e.g., A. SINCLmA, PROHmrmoN 75-91 (1965); PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH NATIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE ANTi-SA.OON LEAGUE OF AMERICA 79-84, 84-87, 120-1 (1915); PROCEEINGS
OF THE FwsEENT NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE OF AMECA 70-76
88-97, 110-3, 124-9 (1913).
87 See note 10 supra on the care of mental incompetents.
88 See note 9 supra.
89 Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd
per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); Application of President & Directors of Georgetown Col-
lege, 331 F.2d 1000, rehearing denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964); In re Brooks' Estate,
32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965), cert. denied, 377 US. 978 (1966), noted in 64 MICH.
L. REv. 554 (1966); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 NJ. 421,
201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1965); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27,
252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See Note, The Right to Die, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 591 (1966).
90 The patient so refusing is invariably a Jehovah's Witness. For a general background
on the conflict between the Jehovah's Witnesses and medicine, see How, Religion, Medi-
cine and Law, 3 CAN. B.J. 365 (1960).
91 A broadening of the first amendment freedom of religion guarantee to include "free-
dom of convictions" appears to be occurring in the realm of the Selective Service con-
scientious objector exemption from military duty. While the exemption is a matter of
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religiously inoffensive behavior which historically has seldom been
characterized by the morality effect.
Thus, a sliding scale, with conduct having a large morality effect
on one end of the spectrum and behavior with no morality effect on
the other end, may partially explain the judicial reaction to challenges
to regulations of conduct not substantially affecting others. At first
glance this may appear to be reducible to the proposition that, if the
majority feels strongly enough about a mode of behavior, restrictions
will be upheld. But on closer examination, one sees that legal intru-
sion.into private conduct frequently has religious overtones. Purely
culturally deviant behavior, though often abhorred and met by social
sanctions, is seldom proscribed by law.92 The morality effect, in view of
the establishment clause of the first amendment, may itself present con-
stitutional issues, but so far it has not been questioned on these grounds.
D. Mill and the Constitution
Mills principle is directed primarily to limitation of the police
power. Whether his criterion is actually reflected in any constitutional
protection is problematical. The challenges to regulation of conduct
allegedly not affecting others have been made on several grounds, but
only in the liquor and motorcycle cases has Mill's criterion been invoked
by the challengers. Thus, only in these two categories has the issue
been squarely put, and in both situations the decisions have been mixed
both as to outcome and rationale. The Supreme Court has never dealt
directly with the issue, but in the relevant decisions has deferred to
the judgment of the legislatures. The state courts in the early liquor
legislative grace and not of constitutional right, Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901, 912
(5th Cir. 1968), the Supreme Court has given a very broad interpretation to the phrases
"religious training and belief" and "Supreme Being" to avoid a due process complication
in the administration of the exemption. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). The
statutory exemption does not cover a non-theistic moral code, but the Court declined to
deal with the question of atheistic beliefs as it was not presented. Id. at 173-4. However,
a recent decision dealt directly with the issue and held for the conscientious objector ap-
plicant. United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (Mass. 1969), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 816
(1969). See also United States v. Shacter, 293 F. Supp. 1057 (Md. 1968).
92 Historically various sects have been socially deprecated, but not legally persecuted,
by specific statutes. The case of the Mormons was clearly within the morality effect.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The
Polygamy Cases, 9 UTAH L. REv. 308, 543 (1964-65). More recently, uncleanliness, length of
hair, and style of dress have drawn strong public disfavor, but little serious thought is
given to banning such behavior per se. Indeed, several federal courts have held that a
ban on long hair is unconstitutional even as applied to minors as a condition of school
attendance. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. applied for, 38 U.S.L.W. 3348
(1969); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969); Richards v. Thurston,.304 F.
Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969).
93 Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925); Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304 (1917);
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decisions cited no specific constitutional provision, but simply held
that the prohibition of the possession of liquor was an invalid exercise
of the police power.94 The due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment was invoked by those courts invalidating the motorcycle helmet
requirement. 95
The lack of reference to any specific constitutional provision in the
early state liquor cases indicates a feeling of inherent limitations of
the states' power, and this feeling was manifested against governments
which are not confined to "enumerated powers." This suggests that
there exist, at least in the opinion of some courts, underlying "inalien-
able" rights which remain in the people. A surfacing of this under-
current was made explicit in the Supreme Court's decision in Griswold
v. Connecticut,96 which voided a state ban on contraceptives as an un-
constitutional invasion of the privacy of married couples. The Court
relied on the ninth amendment and its protection of rights "retained
by the people,"9' 7 and although it seems unsettled whether the ninth
amendment is a separate constitutional guarantee or merely a signpost
referring back to the fifth amendment due process clause, 98 Griswold
does open the door to constitutional arguments based on unenumerated
individual rights. Exactly what these rights are has not been explicitly
detailed, but it seems certain that the list will be influenced by the
writings of many of the political philosophers who have become part of
the political heritage of the nation; and Mill is without doubt to be
included among these writers. Indeed, Mill appears to be one of the
main influences on this undercurrent of unenumerated rights as is
evidenced by recurrent allusions to the "right to be let alone."99
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 628 (1887). The denial of certiorari in several of the motorcycle
helmet cases is inconclusive as to the Court's attitude. For citations, see notes 45-46 supra.
94 See authorities cited note 27 supra.
V5 See authorities cited notes 44-45 supra. The ninth amendment was also mentioned in
several cases. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 851, 359, 158
N.W.2d 72, 76 (1968); Commonwealth v. Howie, 288 N.E.2d 373 (Mass.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 99 (1968) (petition for certiorari summarized at 37 U.S.LW. 8211).
98 881 US. 479 (1965). For an excellent discussion of the case, see Symposium on the
Griswold Case and the Right of Privacy, 64 Mics. L. REv. 197 (1965).
97 U.S. CoNsr. amend. IX: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." For a prophetic
discussion on the Griswold problem, see Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights... Retained
by the People"?, 87 N.Y.U.L. REv. 787 (1962). See also Kutner, The Neglected Ninth
Amendment: The "Other Rights" Retained by the People, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 121 (1967).
98 Note, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 8 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 814,
828-32 (1966); see also Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental
and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 Micr. L. REv. 235, 246-7 (1965).
99 The "right to be let alone" found its strongest impetus in Justice Brandeis' famous
dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928):
The makers of our Constitution ... sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
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By more traditional standards, the concept of limitations on the
police power is a basic ingredient of substantive due process.100 Al-
though the doctrine of substantive due process is amorphous and has
been narrowed by post New Deal decisions,101 the limitations on the
police power expounded by Mill have not been explicitly or implicitly
excluded from its scope. Indeed, the theory that the ninth amendment
is a signpost to the due process clause 10 2 adds force to the argument in
light of Griswold, since in many cases substantive due process concep-
tually is analogous to a theory of retention of unenumerated rights. 103
The first amendment'0 4 also affords a basis for Mill's argument in
proper situations. Various balancing concepts, either in freedom of
speech or in freedom of religion, require as one ingredient an evaluation
of the state's interest, specifically, whether the statute bears a substan-
tial enough relation to the public health, safety, or welfare to override
the restriction of first amendment claims. The absence of any substan-
tial effect of the proscribed conduct on others in such cases would
seriously detract from the state's interest in regulating such conduct.
In those areas where the sole basis of legislation is the morality effect
(especially sex laws), it might be argued that the enforcement of private
morals is an unconstitutional establishment of religion in that such
legislation imposes adherence to the religious beliefs of the majority
upon those not of the same belief. 1 5
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.
This dissent was the forerunner of the present law on illegal searches and seizures. See
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-7 (1961);
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 762 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 159 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129, 141 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
The above principle has been increasingly invoked outside the search and seizure con-
text. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Application of President &
Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1010, 1016-7 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Burger, J., dis-
senting) (blood transfusion case); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App.
351, 359, 158 N.W.2d 72, 76 (1968).
100 See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MxcHi. L. REv. 219, 222-7
(1965); Comment, Substantive Due Process in the States Revisited, 18 Omio ST. L.J. 384
(1957).
101 Professor Emerson makes the distinction between personal and economic rights.
Emerson, supra note 100, at 223-5. It is in the realm of economic rights that the doctrine
has been discredited. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Indeed, Justice Black's dissent in Griswold was premised on the
assumption that substantive due process had been totally discredited. 381 U.S. at 511-6.
102 See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
103 See Emerson, supra note 100.
104 See notes 54-60, 89-91 supra and accompanying text.
105 Comment, Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others
in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 581, 600 (1967).
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Although the first amendment may cover only a few modes of be-
havior falling within Mill's doctrine, the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth in conjunction with the ninth amendment, would give
a broad basis to the acceptance of Mill by the courts.
CONCLUSION
Although Mill wrote almost a century after the Constitution was
written, his philosophy on the scope of the state's power to regulate
individual conduct enjoys enduring vitality. Its major impact on the
American political system may be in the screening of measures in the
legislative process, thus leaving only borderline application to the
courts. But even in these borderline cases, Mill's impact on the judicial
system is significant. While an argument based on Mill's criterion
against the validity of a statute may not always be heeded by the courts,
it is a respectable argument and is seldom flatly rejected. Indeed,
Griswold v. Connecticut and Stanley v. Georgia, as well as several of
the motorcycle helmet cases, may substantially increase the respect-
ability of such an argument and may indicate a more willing reception
by the courts.
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